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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THOMAS A. PAULSEN COMPANY,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs.

SUPREME COURT

:

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and DEFAULT INDEMNITY
FUND OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:

Case No. 21049
Category No. 6

:
REPLY BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Throughout these proceedings, both before this Court
and before the Industrial Commission below, the Default Indemnity
Fund ("Fund'1) has made a number of substantial misrepresentations
of fact.

These misrepresentations are of such a nature that it

raises the question of whether they were made with the intent to
mislead.
To this Court, both in its Motion for Summary
Disposition and in its Brief, the Fund made the following
representation of fact:
"The Findings of Fact entered by the law judge
after a hearing before the Industrial
Commission on David's [the injured employee]
application for workers1 compensation benefits
enumerated the benefits to which David was
entitled and went on to say: fThese . . . are
the responsibility of the employer, since the
employer was uninsured for workers'

compensation purposes at the time of the
industrial injury.'"
Respondents1 Brief, p. 2.
This statement of "fact" implies that in the original
Findings of Fact the judge enumerated all of the benefits to
which the employee was entitled and found that they are the
responsibility of the employer.

This representation is made

throughout the Fund's Brief, see e.g., Respondents' Brief, p. 32.
A review of the Order, R c 72, reveals that the Fund drastically
misstated the Finding.

Instead of referring to all benefits to

which the employee was entitled, the judge was referring only to
certain enumerated expenses.

It was to some $6,800.00 in medical

expenses that the judge was referring when he said, "These
expenses are the responsibility of the employer. . . w

Nowhere in

the Findings does the judge enumerate the benefits to which the
employee was entitled and goes on to state that they are the
responsibility of the employer.

Nowhere does the judge state

that the Petitioner ("Paulsen") is liable for compensation
benefits.

The implication created by the Fund's statement of

"fact," i.e., that the law judge set forth the liability of
Paulsen for all benefits, is misleading.
Next, the Fund in its Motion for Summary Disposition
and also in its Brief represented to this Court that it "filed a
motion on September 24, 1985, pursuant to Section 35-1-78

(U.C.A.f 1953, as amended).

The motion requested the entry of a

Supplemental or Amended Order (R.76)."

Respondents' Brief, p. 3.

Furthermore, the Fund refers to its "motion" as a "motion to
amend," and states that the Industrial Commission "amended its
Order."

Respondents' Brief, pp. 18, 30 (emphasis added).
The simple fact is that the Fund made no motion at all.

Rather, the Fund sent an ex parte letter to the administrative
law judge requesting the issuance of a supplemental order, not an
amended order (R.76).
types of orders.

There is a vast difference between the two

This difference the Fund recognizes; yet

because it now claims that the Order dated October 8, 1985 merely
corrected a clerical error, which procedurally would require an
amended order, it now seeks to characterize its ex parte letter
as a motion to amend.
Furthermore, during the proceedings before the
Industrial Commission, by means of its ex parte letter, the Fund
made further misrepresentations.

It represented that the

original Order "required that Thomas A. Paulsen Co. pay David B.
Paulsen certain sums of money representing workers' compensation
benefits as a result of his industrial accident" and that the
Order required that the "Default Indemnity Fund pay those
benefits with full rights of subrogation" (R.76).

A review of

the original Order demonstrates that both representations were
false (R.71-75).

ARGUMENT
In its Brief, the Fund raises a number of arguments.
Only four of these arguments address the issues at bar.

These

are whether the employer can escape ultimate liability for
injuries to the employee; whether the Industrial Commission can
order an employer to pay monies directly to the Default Indemnity
Fund; whether there was a clerical error in the January 23, 1985
Order; and whether that Order was an Interlocutory Order.
Arguments one and two will be discussed in Point I below.

The

other arguments will be discussed separately in Points II and
III.

POINT I
THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND'S RIGHT
OF SUBROGATION DOES NOT EMPOWER THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO ORDER AN
EMPLOYER TO PAY MONIES DIRECTLY TO
THE DEFAULT INDEMNITY FUND.
In Point I of its Brief, the Fund presents three
arguments in support of the Supplemental Order.

First, the Fund

argues that an employer cannot escape ultimate liability for
workers' compensation benefits due the employee; second, that the
existence of the Fund does not alter or excuse this ultimate
liability; and third, that the Fundfs subrogation rights entitles
it to reimbursement.
time on appeal.

These contentions are raised for the first

"It is axiomatic that defenses and claims not

raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered for the
first time on appeal."

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102

(Utah 1983).
Should the Fund be allowed to make its argument,
Paulsen responds that the Fund's contentions are irrelevant to
the issues at bar.

Paulsen contends that the law judge made a

determination that Paulsen had no liability to pay benefits to
the injured employee primarily because Paulsen was unable to pay,
because he had made a good faith effort to obtain insurance, and
because there were other sources of funds available.

This view

of the judge's thinking is supported by the original Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

First, the sentence which

reads, "These expenses are the responsibility of the employer,
since the employer was uninsured for workers1 compensation
purposes at the time of the industrial injury" indicates that the
judge thought that the employer was liable only if there were no
other sources available for payment.

There would be no reason to

set forth the second clause of the sentence if the judge viewed
the employer's liability as the Fund does.

Second, the judge

made a finding of fact that Paulsen made a good-faith effort to
be insured.

Why make this finding unless the judge felt it was

of some significance?

Third, the judge did not impose the

fifteen percent (15%) penalty provided for under Section
35-1-107(8), U.C.A.

And fourth, Section 35-1-82.52, U.C.A.,

requires the law judge to set forth the party responsible for
paying compensation benefits•
the responsible party•

The judge named only the Fund as

By so doing, the judge indicated that

Paulsen was not responsible.

These Findings, as they stand, are

sufficient to support a judicial determination that Paulsen was
not liable to the employee, as there were other sources of funds
available.
If Paulsen's contention is correct, i.e., that the
judge determined that Paulsen was not liable, then whether an
employer has ultimate liability or not is now irrelevant.

If the

Order was legally insufficient, the Fund could have appealed
within the required time.

It did not, and may not raise that

argument now.
The Fund further contends that possible criminal
liability demonstrates that the Fund was not set up to indemnify
the employer.

Again, this is raised for the first time.

For the

reasons set forth above, whether Paulsen was guilty of 36
separate misdemeanors, even if true, is now irrelevant.
The Fund finally contends that its rights of
subrogation granted in Section 35-1-107(3), U.C.A., enables the
Industrial Commission to order Paulsen to pay monies directly to
the Fund.
appeal.

Again, this argument is raised for the first time on

The Fund reasons that since the employee could go to the

Industrial Commission to seek redress and the Commission could

order the employer to pay money to the employee, then because the
Fund has the rights of the employee by subrogation, a fortiori,
the Commission can order the employer to pay money to the Fund.
The Fundfs tantalogical argument contains one major
flaw.

Section 35-1-107(3), U.C.A., limits the Fund's subrogation

rights to those rights, powers, and benefits held by an employee
against an employer who fails to make the compensation payments.
The employee's rights in such a case as set forth in Section
35-1-59, U.C.A., are limited solely to docketing an abstract of
the award with a district court and executing thereon.
Therefore, the Fund's subrogation rights only extend to docketing
the abstract of the award in the district court.

The Commission

has no authority to order Paulsen to pay money directly to the
Fund.

The Fund's argument when taken to its logical conclusion

suggests that where the employer is uninsured, the Fund could, by
making a payment of benefits to an employee, step into the shoes
of the injured employee, even before the employee seeks
compensation.

Thereby, under its view of its subrogation powers,

the Fund could obtain the right to determine whether to pursue a
civil or administrative remedy against the employer, and
thereafter obtain an order directing the employer to pay money
directly to it.

The enabling act does not go so far, either to

allow the Fund the above rights or the rights it now asserts.

n

Furthermore, the Fund's argument misconstrues the
meaning of the word "subrogation."

Subrogation simply allows the

substitution of one party for another.

In other words, the Fund

can only obtain the rights held by the employee.

It cannot

obtain any rights independent of or greater than the employee's
rights.

Inasmuch as the employee had already obtained an award

from the Commission, he could not obtain another award for the
same injury.

Yet, the Fund argues that its subrogation rights

granted it the power to obtain a second award.

If the Fund's

contention is correct, i.e., that Paulsen is obligated to pay
benefits under the original Order, and if the Supplemental Order
is valid, then Paulsen is obligated to pay the awards of both
Orders.

The Fund's argument cannot avoid this result.

The

Supplemental Order did nothing to extinguish Paulsen's alleged
obligation under the original Order.

However, if Paulsen was not

liable under the original Order, which is necessary to avoid
double liability, then the Supplemental Order granted rights to
the Fund which the employee was denied in the original Order,
i.e., rights against Paulsen.

Thus the Supplemental Order

conferred rights independent of those granted the employee.
The rub in this case is that the judge did not order
Paulsen to make any payment to the employee.

Thereforer the

employee had no rights against the employer.

Thus the Fund had

no rights against the employer.

If the Fund felt this improper,

it should have sought review within the applicable time period to
have Paulsen included in the order to pay the employee's
benefits.

The Commission's Supplemental Order requiring Paulsen

to pay money directly to the Fund was improper.

Simply stated,

the Fund's right of subrogation extended only to docketing an
abstract of an award to the employee, not the Fund, and executing
thereon.

The Fund does not need a Supplemental Order to exercise

what rights it has.

The Fund had no rights to obtain an order

directing Paulsen to pay money directly to it.

POINT II
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER WAS NOT
ISSUED TO CORRECT A CLERICAL ERROR.
The Fund next contends that its ex parte letter and the
Supplemental Order issued pursuant thereto were in response to a
clerical error.

Again, this contention is raised for the first

time on appeal.

The Court should not permit late-raised

justifications for prior actions.
If the Fund is permitted to make this argumentf Paulsen
responds as follows:

Assuming arguendo that the Commission has

authority to correct clerical errors, the Supplemental Order was
improper for four reasons:

First, at the time the Fund requested

the Supplemental Orderf neither the Fund nor the Commission
thought that the Supplemental Order was to correct a clerical
error.

Second, the January 22, 1985 Order did not contain a

clerical error*

Third, even if the original Order contained a

clerical error, the Commission went too far in making the alleged
correction*

And fourth, proper procedures were not used making

the alleged correction*
A.

At the time the Fund requested the Supplemental

Order, neither the Fund nor the Commission thought that the
Supplemental Order was to correct a clerical error*
There is absolutely no evidence that at the time the
Supplemental Order was entered, the Fund or the Commission
thought the original Order contained a clerical error.

In fact,

the Fundfs actions and earlier statements demonstrate the
opposite to be true*
In its letter to the law judge, seeking the issuance of
the Supplemental Order, the Fund made two representations of
facts

First, that the original Order required Paulsen to pay

benefits to the injured employee? and second, that the original
Order granted the Fund the rights of subrogation.

See R.76*

However, these two "facts" are the very "facts" it now represents
to this Court that the original Order lacked.
"In reviewing the Findings of Fact entered in
conjunction with that Order, it is clear that
the law judge had omitted language from the
Order regarding the employer's ultimate
liability*"
Respondents1 Brief, p. 18.
And also:

-10-

"The Order which was based upon those findings
inadvertently failed to reflect either the
Fund's subrogation rights as against the
employer or the employer's ultimate
responsibility for payment of the benefits."
Respondents1 Brief, p. 19.
The Fund cannot assert to the tribunal below a need for
a Supplemental Order based on the existence of a specific set of
facts and then justify to this Court on appeal the issuance of
the Supplemental Order by asserting that those same facts do not
exist.

The Fund's argument is duplicitous.
Additionally, the record is abundantly clear that the

Fund was not seeking to correct a clerical error.

In requesting

the Supplemental Order the Fund made no mention of any supposed
inadequacies in the original Order.

The Fund only sought an

order requiring Paulsen to pay money directly to the Fund.
That the Fund was not seeking to correct a clerical
error is further buttressed by the fact that it sought a
supplemental order.

Even though the procedures for correcting a

clerical error are not set forth in the statute, it is clear that
a supplemental order is not the proper procedure.

A nunc pro

tunc amendment of the original Order is the proper way to correct
such errors.

Apparently in recognition of this fact, the Fund

now contends that its letter constituted "a motion to amend the
Order . . . "
the case.

Respondents' Brief, p. 18.

This, however, was not

The Fund requested the Commission to "issue a
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Supplemental Order . . ." (R.76) (emphasis added).

There is a

fundamental distinction between a request to enter an amended
Order and a request to issue a Supplemental Order.
Moreover, the Fund now contends that its "motion" was
made so that the Order would correctly reflect "the Findings of
Fact, the express intent of the administrative law judge, and the
law applicable to this case."
emphasis added.

Respondents' Brief, p. 18,

For the Fund to seek to have the Order correctly

reflect the applicable law indicates that the Fund was seeking,
at least in part, a correction of a judicial determination and
not a correction of a clerical error.
Finally, the Fund contends that a clerical error
"resulted in the omission of the specific finding of fact
regarding the employer's ultimate liability."
Brief, p* 3-4, emphasis added.

Respondents1

Thus, the Fund contends that not

only did the judge inadvertently omit language in the Order
requiring Paulsen to pay any benefits, but that the judge also
omitted finding ultimate liability on Paulsen's part.
liability to exist, the judge must make such findings.
35-1-82.52, U.C.A.

For
Section

That the Fund sought a supplemental order to

supply an allegedly omitted finding, and also sought in the same
supplemental order to have the original Order modified to reflect
the added finding is far beyond any attempt to correct a clerical
error.

-12-

It is also clear from the record that the Commission
did not consider the Fund's request to be a "motion" to correct a
clerical error.

If the Supplemental Order was intended to

correct a mere omission in the Order, all that would be required
is the addition of the omitted item.

There would be no reason to

add additional Findings in an effort to support the Supplemental
Order.
R.77.

Yet the Supplemental Order contains additional Findings.
Therefore, it is clear that the Commission did not

consider the ex parte letter as a motion to correct a clerical
error.
B.

The January 22, 1985 Order did not contain a

clerical error.
It is generally held that where a party moves to have a
clerical error corrected, that party bears the burden of proof.
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 221.

Further, the power to

enter the amendment nunc pro tunc should be exercised only upon
clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
Judgments, Section 217.

Nothing should be left to guesswork,

speculation, or conjecture.
93 P.2d 934 (Wyo. 1939).

46 Am. Jur. 2d,

Application of Beaver Dan Ditch Co.,

Therefore, the Fund has the burden of

proving the existence of a clerical error by clear and convincing
evidence, without resort to guesswork, speculation, or
conjecture.

The proof set forth by the Fund does not rise to

this standard.

Accordingly, this Court should find that no

clerical error was made.

-13-

As stated above, this is the first time the Fund has
raised the contention that its letter filed on September 24, 1985
was a motion to correct a clerical error.

Therefore, the only

evidence which supports its contention must be found in the
original Order.

The Fund contends that because the Findings

contain the language, "These expenses are the responsibility of
the employer . . . ," and yet the Order does not require Paulsen
to pay benefits, there was an "inadvertent" omission and a
clerical error.
Assuming that an administrative agency has authority to
correct a clerical error, and that that authority is as broad as
the authority granted under Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., then the Fund
is correct in defining a clerical error as a "mistake or omission
mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which
does not involve a legal decision . . . "

Stranger v. Sentinel

Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983).

However,

the mistake that the Fund claims to have occurred is not apparent
from the record, nor is the proof thereof free from guesswork,
speculation, or conjecture, and in fact the so-called "mistake"
involved a legal decision.
The Fund assumes that the administrative law judge
inadvertently omitted ordering Paulsen to pay the benefits.

In

support of this, the Fund states that the judge enumerated the
benefits the worker was entitled to be paid and then stated:

-14-

"These . • . are the responsibility of the employer. • •w
Respondents' Brief, p. 2.

The Fund apparently concludes that

this finding should be reflected in the Order.
the Fund misstates the Findings.

As shown above,

If the portion excised by the

fund is supplied, the meaning of the sentence changes.

It is

clear that the sentence refers only to the medical expenses.
Nowhere in the Findings does the judge state that Paulsen is
liable for compensation benefits.

Therefore, even if this Court

were to accept the Fund's late-asserted contention of clerical
error, it must reduce the Supplemental Order to the amount of
$6,804.49.
Further, as pointed out in Point I, supra, the original
Findings indicate that the judge treated the Fund as an insurer,
and therefore considered Paulsen to have no liability either to
the employee or to the Fund.

Nowhere does the judge state that

Paulsen is liable to the Fund for any amounts paid by the Fund.
It is for this reason that Paulsen is not ordered to pay
benefits.

This omission was the result of a legal decision.

was not, therefore, a clerical error.

It

The Fund cannot show

otherwise without guesswork, speculation, or conjecture.

Whether

the judge was correct in his determination is now irrelevant as
the time for review has passed.

The Fund advanced nothing in the

tribunal below to meet its burden of proof and has failed to meet
its burden here.

The the Supplemental Order should be vacated as

no clerical error has been shown.

-15-

clerical error, the Supplemental Order is invalid as it does more
than correct a clerical error.
If this Court accepts the Fund's contention that its
"motion," i.e., its ex parte letter, was to correct a clerical
error, it must nevertheless vacate the Supplemental Order.

The

Supplemental Order goes far beyond anything necessary to correct
the contended error.

The Fund claims to have sought the addition

of language in the Order regarding the employer's ultimate
liability.

Respondents1 Brief, p. 18.

The only indication in

the original Findings of Fact which would support the Fund's
determination that Paulsen had "ultimate liability" is the
language that the medical expenses are the responsibility of the
employer.

The judge gave no indication that the employer was

responsible for the compensation benefits.

Therefore, the most

that the Fund could have received under its theory was an order
compelling Paulsen to pay $6,804.49 to the employee.
The Supplemental Order requires Paulsen to pay
$21,002.63 to the Fund.

R.77.

As discussed in Point I, not only

is this greater than the rights provided by Section 35-1-107,
U.C.A., which gives the Fund only those rights held by the unpaid
employee, it far exceeds anything necessary to correct a clerical
error.

A correction of a clerical error would have simply

required a nunc pro tunc order adding Paulsen's name to the

-16-

original Order.

Therefore, the Supplemental Order is invalid as

it goes beyond what is necessary to correct a clerical error.

As

the Supplemental Order goes too far, it should be vacated.
D.

A Finding of clerical error cannot be sustained

because proper procedures were not followed by the Commission.
The Workers' Compensation Act provides no guidelines
for the procedure of correcting a clerical error.

Assuming that

the Fund is correct in its assertion that Section 35-1-78
provides the administrative agency with authority to make such
corrections, the agency must follow procedures necessary to reach
a proper determination.

Paulsen admits that the procedures of

the Commission are more relaxed than those of the Courts;
howeverf they should not be so relaxed that substantial errors
are thereby permitted to occur.

Due process is also required of

administrative agencies.
The record shows that the so-called "motion" of the
Fund was ex parte, that it was filed late, that the Fund's
request substantially misstated the original Order (The letter
states that Paulsen was required by the Order to pay benefits to
the employee and that the Order provided the Fund with full
rights of subrogation.

Neither representation was correct

[R.76].), that no evidence was taken on the "motion," and that no
hearing was held on the "motion."

In fact, very few, if any,

procedures were followed in issuing the Supplemental Order.

-17-

Paulsen had no opportunity to contradict the Fund's assertions or
to defend his own position.
process.

Paulsen was thereby denied due

The Supplemental Order issued pursuant to such faulty

procedures should be set aside as invalid.
E.

The Default Indemnity Fund should be estopped from

asserting that the original Order contained a clerical error.
As pointed out in Subsection "A," suprar the Fund
represented to the administrative law judge that the original
Order required Paulsen to pay benefits to the employee and also
granted to Fund the rights of subrogation.

It would be

inequitable to allow the Fund to assert now that the original
Order does not require Paulsen to pay benefits or grant to the
Fund the rights of subrogation.

The Fund should be estopped from

making these assertions.

POINT III
THE JANUARY 22, 1985 ORDER WAS NOT
INTERLOCUTORY IN NATURE.
The Fund's final contention is that the original Order
was an interlocutory order and did not start the appeal time
running.

Again, this argument is raised for the first time on

appeal and should not be considered by the Court.
However, Paulsen responds that the Fund's suggestion is
incredible.

The language of the Order could not be more clear:

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for
Review of the foregoing shall be filed in

-18-

writing within fifteen (15) days from the date
hereof specifying in detail the particular
errors and objections and unless so filed this
Order shall be final and not subject to review
or appeal." R.74.
The assertion that the Order was final only as to the employeefs
entitlement to benefits and the petitionees then existing
inability to pay also contradicts the clear language of the
Order.
The Fund's assertion that because the Order was silent
in certain areas the Order became interlocutory in nature is
certainly unique, and is unsupported by case law.

Furthermore,

the Order is silent only under the Fund's view of the facts.

The

case cited by the Fund, Lantham Co. v. The Industrial Commission,
29 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (March 17, 1986), is of no help.

In

Lantham, the judge specifically deferred the determination of a
particular issue, which deferral made the order interlocutory.
However, here the judge specifically stated that the Order was to
be final.

No deferral was made or intended.

cited case is distinguishable.

Therefore, the

If the Fund felt that the Order

lacked some essential item, it should have sought review within
the proper time as directed by the Order.

The Fund's failure to

do so does not change a final order into an interlocutory order.
The Fund argues that the issue of the Fund's
subrogation rights was reserved to a later date in the event the
petitioner's financial ability improved.

-19-

Respondents' Brief, p.

32.

This "statement of fact" is either accurate or it is not.

The Fund cannot assert facts in the alternative.

If truef the

cited "fact" undermines the Fund's clerical-error theory.

If the

judge deferred a determination of the Fund's subrogation rights,
then the omission of the Fund's subrogation rights in the
original Order was not inadvertent and could not constitute a
clerical error.

Either the judge deferred the issue or he did

not, but the Fund cannot have it both ways.
Furthermore, if the Fund is correct in contending that
the original Order was interlocutory because the judge deferred a
determination of the Fund's subrogation rights until Paulsen's
financial position improved, then the Supplemental Order must
necessarily be vacated.

No evidence was offered or adduced as to

whether Paulsen's financial position had improved.

Due process

would require some form of a hearing before the final order was
entered.

The Supplemental Order was issued without a hearing and

therefore violated Paulsen's rights to due process.
Accordingly, the Supplemental Order should be vacated.
Again, if the Fund is correct in its contention/ then
the facts as contended would support Paulsen's position.

In

order for the Fund's assertion to be accurater the judge must
necessarily have determined that the Fund's right to
reimbursement depended upon the employer's ability to pay.
Otherwise^ why would the judge defer the determination of the
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subrogation rights "to a later date in the event the petitioner's
financial ability improved."

Respondents' Brief, p. 32.

Finally, the Fund's list of what the judge did not do
in the original Order based on what the judge could not do is
irrelevant.

As pointed out above, the issue of whether the judge

acted within his authority in the original Order is now closed.
If the judge made an improper determination in the original
Order, it was subject to review only for 15 days.

After that

time had expired the Fund cannot contest the Order by alleging
that the judge was without authority to so act.

CONCLUSION
The Fund presents four arguments in response to
Paulsen's Brief:

First, that the employer cannot escape ultimate

liability for injuries to the employee; second, that the Fund's
rights of subrogation entitled it to an order requiring Paulsen
to pay money directly to it; third, that the original Order
contained a clerical error; and fourth, that the original Order
was interlocutory in nature.

Each of these arguments was raised

for the first time on appeal and should be disregarded.

However,

even if the Fund's contentions receive full consideration, it has
been shown that they are either irrelevant to the issues at bar,
that they are inconsistent with positions taken previously, or
that they are not in accordance with the established law.

The Fund's contention that Paulsen cannot escape
ultimate liability for payment of the benefits is irrelevant.

If

the judge made a determination on this issue, then
reconsideration has been foreclosed as a timely review was not
sought*

The Fund's contention that the Supplemental Order, which

required Paulsen to pay money directly to the Fund, was valid
does not accord with established law.

The Commission has no

statutory authority to order an employer to pay money directly to
the Fund.

Furthermore, the Fund's subrogation rights are limited

to those rights held by employee against an unpaying employer.
Inasmuch as the employee had no rights against the employer, the
Fund had no rights against the employer.

The Fund's contention

that the Supplemental Order amended the original Order and
corrected a clerical error was shown inconsistent with its prior
position taken below.

It was also shown that the Fund failed to

meet its burden in establishing the existence of a clerical
error.

Finally, the Fund's contention that the original Order

was interlocutory in nature was shown to be unsupported by the
law, contradictory to the language of the original Order, and
inconsistent with the other factual positions taken by the Fund.
For the above reasons, as well as those set forth in Petitioner's
Brief, the Supplemental Order should be vacated.
Respectfully submitted this

j£ / — day of August, lj?8j^.

TANNER, BOWEN & TANNER

By

^3~

Attorneys for P^Ttioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

sCJ

day of August,

1986, ^ true and correct copjfeof petitioner's REPLY BRIEF was
hand delivered to:
Suzan Pixton, Esq.
Attorney for Respondents
160 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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